Introduction
This paper studies the endogenous formation of joint ventures among symmetric firms, where efficiency gains from a joint venture increase with the size of the venture. One example of a joint venture that generates efficiency gains is a network joint venture which links productive assets of member firms. The value of a network increases with the total number of interconnected facilities of member firms. For example, the value of an automated teller machine (ATM) network or a credit card network increases with the number of member banks. 1 Another example of an efficiency-enhancing business alliance is a research joint venture among firms with complementary research knowledge or assets. By exchanging technical know-how, by combining complementary R&D skills, or by avoiding duplication of research efforts, members of a research joint venture can develop a new technology at a lower cost than would be possible in the absence of collaboration (Grossman and Shapiro, 1986) .
Because the formation of efficiency-enhancing joint ventures also frequently benefits consumers, antitrust authorities take hospitable attitudes toward joint ventures. 2 However, joint ventures among competing firms also raise a number of antitrust concerns, including the possibility that a joint venture could restrict competition by adopting exclusionary membership rules. 3 Indeed, joint-venture access rules have been the subject of a continuing controversy in antitrust (Baker, 1993; Balto, 1995; Carlton and Frankel, 1995a, 1995b; Carlton and Salop, 1996; Evans and Schmalensee, 1995; Hovenkamp, 1995; Schmalensee, 1995; and Salop, 1995) . 4 In a recent antitrust case on exclusionary access rules, Dean Witter, the Discover Charge card issuer, alleged that the Visa joint venture caused it substantial competitive harm by denying membership. The Visa venture argued that its membership rules were necessary to protect its past investments in creating the network. It also argued that granting membership to Dean Witter would reduce competition in network services between Discover card and Visa card.
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In this paper, I attempt to shed some light on the controversy surrounding exclusionary access rules by studying stable structures of efficiency-enhancing joint ventures under two different access rules: Yi and Shin's (1997) simultaneous-move "Open Membership" rule and through escalating membership fees). In a simple example, I show that the reduction in the existing members' profits can outweigh the increase in the new members' profits. Intuitively, the industry-wide joint venture need not maximize industry profit, because industry output is highest under the industry-wide joint venture. Hence, unrestricted side payments do not eliminate the incentives of members of a large venture to restrict membership. In contrast, the industry-wide joint venture emerges as the unique stable outcome in the Open Membership game, because an outsider can join a joint venture without the consent of its existing members.
The current paper thus provides a theoretical identification of the circumstances under which mandated access to a joint venture is welfare-improving.
Before introducing the formal model, I briefly discuss related literature (other than the aforementioned antitrust literature on joint-venture access rules). First, this paper extends Bloch's (1995) analysis of stable joint ventures in oligopoly in the Coalition Unanimity game.
Bloch examined the endogenous formation of efficiency-enhancing joint ventures (which he called "associations") for the case of linear demand functions and cost functions with constant returns to scale in both production and productive assets. He showed that, in the linear model, the unique equilibrium coalition structure of the Coalition Unanimity game consists of either the grand coalition or two coalitions of asymmetric sizes. I extend his analysis to general demand and cost functions. I identify conditions under which the industry-wide joint venture does and does not arise as the equilibrium outcome of the Coalition Unanimity game.
Second, in the current paper, members of a large joint venture succeed in keeping rival firms' costs high by restricting membership in their venture. Even though members of a large joint venture remain as competitors in the output market so that they lack classical market power to raise price by restricting their own output, the refusal to expand membership confers exclusionary market power to members of a large joint venture by disadvantaging rival firms.
Thus, this paper can be viewed as an example of the "raising rivals' costs" literature which emphasizes the harm of exclusionary market power (Salop and Scheffman, 1983; Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986; Krattenmaker, Lande, and Salop, 1987) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a homogeneous-good Cournot oligopoly model with productive assets. Section 3 examines the effects of joint-venture formation on profits and consumer surplus. Section 4, the main part of the paper, analyzes equilibrium joint-venture structures under the two membership rules described above.
Section 5 extends the model to symmetric product differentiation under the Cournot and the Bertrand oligopolies and shows that the main results in the previous sections continue to hold.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Homogeneous-good Cournot oligopoly with productive assets
Consider a homogeneous-good Cournot oligopoly with inverse demand P(X ), where X is the industry output. In Cournot oligopoly, each firm chooses its output to maximize its profit, given the other firms' outputs. There are N ex-ante symmetric firms, which have access to a common production technology. Following Farrell and Shapiro (1990) , I assume that a firm's cost of production depends on its stock of productive assets. Firm i's cost function is
given by c i ( 
be the total social surplus. Denote partial derivatives by 
Until the end of Section 4, I assume that there exists a unique interior equilibrium so that the first-order condition (1) holds with equality for all firms. I make the following three assumptions on the demand and cost functions.
Assumption 1 states that an increase in a firm's stock of productive assets lowers both the total cost and the marginal cost of production and that the marginal cost is a weakly increasing function of output.
Assumption 2. P′(X ) < 0 and P′(X
Under Assumption 2, the inverse demand function slopes downward and outputs are strategic substitutes (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985) . Assumptions 1 and 2 jointly ensure that the Cournot equilibrium is "stable": if a firm expands output exogenously, then other firms produce less output in the new equilibrium, but total equilibrium output increases and the equilibrium price falls (Dixit, 1986; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990) .
derivative of the cost function with respect to productive assets.
Under Assumption 3, an equal increase in productive assets for k firms with equal stocks of assets increases their equilibrium profits (see Lemma 3 below). For cost functions 
Assumption 3 becomes more restrictive as N increases, holding other things constant. For 
An inspection of the first-order condition (1) shows that any two firms that have the same stocks of productive assets produce the same level of output. Hence, these two firms earn the same level of equilibrium profits. In addition, we have the following results.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, in equilibrium, firm i produces more output and earns higher profits than firm j if and only if firm i's stock of productive assets is greater than firm j's.
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A total differentiation of firm i's first-order condition (1) yields
or
where
under Assumptions 1 and 2. Summing (3) over i and writing Λ ≡ λ i i=1 N ∑ , the output effect of changes in the stocks of productive assets is
Let y i ≡ X -x i . Then, by the envelope theorem, the change in firm i's profit is given by
where the first term is the "induced output effect" and the second is the "direct cost effect" of changes in productive assets. Proof. See the Appendix.
In Lemma 2, only one firm's (firm i's) stock of productive assets increases. Due to a lower marginal cost of production, firm i expands its output. Other firms reduce their output but total output increases and price falls. Firm i earns higher profits but other firms earn lower profits. In Lemma 3, the productive assets increase by equal amounts for a set of firms with equal stocks of assets. Lemma 3 shows that these firms' equilibrium profits increase. (The other firms earn lower equilibrium profits by Lemma 2.) In particular, starting from a symmetric equilibrium, if all firms experience an equal increase in productive assets, all firms earn higher profits if and only if Assumption 3 is satisfied (assuming Assumptions 1 -2).
7
Notice that Assumption 3 is more likely to be satisfied when E(c ω i ) is smaller. Intuitively, production cost savings are equal to c ω (x i ,ω i ), while the losses from total output expansion are proportional to c xω (x i ,ω i )x i . Hence, the smaller is E(c ω i ) , the more likely it is that a symmetric cost shock raises profits.
3. Joint-venture structures, profits and welfare
By forming a joint venture, the member firms gain access to the total pool of productive assets of members. I assume that each firm initially has one unit of productive assets so that a member of a size-k joint venture has access to k "effective" units of productive assets. 8 This assumption implies that the efficiency gains that accrue to a joint venture increase with its size.
It will be important later whether the efficiency gains increase with its size at an "accelerating" rate or "decelerating" rate --that is, whether combined assets of firms exhibits "increasing"
In order to focus on the efficiency gains from forming joint ventures, I purposely do not deal with investment decisions by venture members and, thus, the effects of membership rules on investment incentives. (See Section 5 for more discussion of this issue.)
Furthermore, I rule out the possibility that the firms use the joint venture as a vehicle to facilitate collusion in the product market.
Since the firms are ex ante symmetric, only the size, not the composition, of the joint venture matters. Thus, we can identify a joint venture by its size. Suppose that the firms form m joint ventures whose sizes are n 1 , n 2 , ..., n m , so that the resulting joint-venture structure is Proof. Suppose that the size-n 1 venture, ..., the size-n k venture merge, where
Decompose the change in the effective units of productive assets into the following k steps. In be proved in an analogous way to Proposition 3. The remaining members of the formerly sizen j venture in Proposition 4 earn lower profits, because their production costs increase both relative to the n i + 1 firms and in absolute terms. If n i > n j , the existing members of the formerly size-n i venture may earn either higher or lower profits as a result of the change in the joint-venture structure because of this disparity in cost reduction.
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1 -3, both consumer surplus and total social surplus are higher under the industry-wide joint venture than under any other joint-venture structure.
Proof. The result on consumer surplus follows from Proposition 2. For social surplus, first suppose that firms merge to the grand coalition (so that their costs are reduced to a new lower level) but that each firm produces its pre-merger output. Social surplus increases because production costs are reduced. Second, equalize output across firms so that each firm produces the pre-merger average output. This output reallocation (weakly) lowers total production cost, because marginal cost of production is (weakly) increasing in output. Third, let all firms expand their output in a symmetric way to the post-merger level. Since price is strictly above each firm's (now equal) marginal cost, this symmetric output expansion increases social surplus.
Q.E.D.
Although total social surplus is maximized under the grand coalition, industry profits need not be. Consider the following example due to Bloch (1995) .
The cost function exhibits constant returns to scale both in output and in productive assets. It is straightforward to show that
, where A ≡ a -c 0 . 10 Yi (1997b) 
Stable joint-venture structures

Rules of joint-venture formation
Open Membership game. Yi and Shin (1997) examine an "Open Membership" game in which membership in a coalition is open to all firms which are willing to abide by the rules of the coalition. 11 In this game, each firm announces an "address" simultaneously. The firms that announce the same address belong to the same coalition. Formally, each firm's action space is to do is simply to change its address to the one announced by members of the coalition.
Infinite-horizon Coalition Unanimity game. Bloch (1995 Bloch ( , 1996 analyzes what can be called an infinite-horizon "Coalition Unanimity" game. The first firm begins the game by proposing a coalition, which forms if and only if all prospective members sequentially agree to form it. (If any potential member rejects the current proposal, the current proposal is invalidated and that firm makes a counter-proposal.) This coalition formation process continues until all firms belong to coalitions. Bloch (1996) shows that the Coalition Unanimity game yields the same stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium coalition structure as the following "Size Announcement" game: firm 1 first announces the size of its coalition s 1 , and the first s 1 firms form a size-s 1 coalition, and then firm s 1 + 1 proposes s 2 , and the next s 2 firms form a size-s 2 coalition, and so on until the last firm is reached. In this game, once a coalition forms, an outsider cannot join it. Hence, the Coalition Unanimity game allows for exclusivity in membership.
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Stable joint-venture structures and welfare
Open Membership game.
Proposition 6. Under Assumptions 1 -3, the industry-wide joint venture is the unique purestrategy Nash equilibrium outcome of the simultaneous-move Open Membership game.
Proof. Consider a joint-venture structure with two or more ventures. By Proposition 4, a member of the smallest venture can increase its profit by joining a larger venture. Hence, such a joint-venture structure is not an equilibrium outcome. The industry-wide joint venture is an equilibrium outcome, because no member would be better off by changing its address and leaving the industry-wide joint venture to form a one-member venture.
Q.E.D.
Coalition Unanimity game. Let C u be the equilibrium joint-venture structure of the Coalition Unanimity game. Let k 0 denote the largest value of k such that the members of a size-(k-1)
venture benefit by merging with a single-firm venture in any joint-venture structure.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 7 shows that the equilibrium joint-venture structure of the Coalition Unanimity game consists of either the industry-wide venture or two asymmetrically-sized ventures, for weakly concave inverse demand functions and for cost functions with constant returns to scale in output and weakly increasing returns to scale in productive assets. Notice that k u , the size of the large coalition in C u , is found by maximizing the per-member profit of the large coalition under the condition that the rest of firms form one opposing coalition.
Hence, for the demand and cost functions in Proposition 7, the grand coalition is the unique equilibrium outcome of the Coalition Unanimity game if and only if π(N;{N}) > π(k;{k,N-k})
However, this last condition is often violated. For an illustration, consider Example 1, where k 0 = (N + 3)/2. We have π(N;{N}) < π(k;{k,N-k}) for all k > (N + 1)/2. Thus, the grand coalition is not the equilibrium outcome of the Coalition Unanimity game in Example 1. Indeed, Bloch (1995) shows that k u = (3N + 1)/4.
Furthermore, the equilibrium joint-venture structure under the Coalition Unanimity game does not maximize industry profits if (but not only if) N ≥ 9. For N ≥ 9, the small venture in C u has at least two members. However, the industry profit-maximizing jointventure structure has only one venture with two or more members. Yi (1997b) shows that industry profits increase by breaking up the small joint venture in C u . Intuitively, breaking up the small venture in C u has three effects. First, per-unit production costs of members of the small venture increase. Second, output is shifted from members of the small venture (with high unit costs) to members of the large venture (with low unit costs). Third, total output decreases and price increases. The first effect reduces industry profits, but the second and third effects increase them. Given the significant size asymmetries of the two ventures in C u , equilibrium outputs of members of the small venture are relatively small. As a result, the first effect is dominated by the second and third effects.
The next three examples illustrate the importance of returns to scale in productive assets in determining the number and sizes of equilibrium joint ventures in the Coalition Unanimity game.
This cost function exhibits increasing returns to scale in productive assets, because µ″(
Hence, Proposition 7 applies: the equilibrium joint-venture structure of the Coalition Unanimity game consists of either the industry-wide venture or two ventures of asymmetric sizes. We
have not been able to find an analytical solution for k u , but simulation results show that k u increases with γ. 
This cost function also exhibits increasing returns to scale in productive assets: µ″(ω i ) = −e ω i < 0. We have
Since In Example 2, the size of the larger joint venture increases with γ, which is a parameter for returns to scale in productive assets. In Example 3, the returns to scale in productive assets are so large that the industry-wide joint venture is the unique equilibrium outcome. In Example 4 with decreasing returns to scale in productive assets, the number of equilibrium joint ventures increases without bound as the number of firms increases. The intuition behind these examples is straightforward. The reason why the equilibrium joint-venture structure of the Coalition Unanimity game may consist of multiple ventures is that the members of a large venture (with a large pool of productive assets) may not find it in their interest to merge with a small venture (with a small pool of productive assets). Members of a large venture may lose from the merger, because their stocks of productive assets increase by a smaller margin than do those of the members of the small venture. Hence, the profitability of the merger to the members of the large venture depends on the value of the additional assets relative to the value of the existing stock of assets --that is, returns to scale in productive assets.
Membership rules and welfare
The above analysis shows that the grand coalition is the unique equilibrium coalition structure under the Open Membership rule but typically not under the Coalition Unanimity rule.
Combining this result with Proposition 5 yields the main welfare result of this paper: 
Corner equilibrium
The analysis so far has assumed that all firms produce positive output under any jointventure structure. However, in an asymmetric joint-venture structure, it is possible that members of small ventures (which have cost disadvantages against members of large ventures) may produce no output in equilibrium. Hence, different membership rules not only affect the equilibrium joint-venture structures, but also the number of active firms. The possibility of a corner equilibrium does not change the main results of this paper. No change is necessary in Lemma 1. The only change necessary in Lemmas 2 and 3 is that strict inequalities are replaced with weak inequalities when we increase the productive assets of a firm with zero production in equilibrium. Thus, Propositions 1 -4 continue to hold when we add the qualification "weakly" 
Symmetrically differentiated products
Cournot competition
Suppose that firm i's inverse demand function is given by p i (x) ≡ p(x i , y i ): firm i's
inverse demand depends only on its own output and on the sum of its competitors' outputs.
15
Firm i's equilibrium output satisfies the first-order condition
Define Under Assumption 2a, (1) a firm's inverse demand decreases in its own output and in the sum of competitors' outputs, but it is more sensitive to its own output than to a competitor's output; (2) outputs are strategic substitutes; (3) the Cournot equilibrium is stable; and (4) the representative consumer has a love-of-variety preference in the sense that she weakly prefers a balanced consumption bundle to an unbalanced one (with the same total quantity). The
Assumption 2a. (Bloch (1995) examines the linear demand function p i (x) ≡ a -x i -βy i derived from this utility function.) When the goods are homogeneous, the last part of Assumption 2a is trivially satisfied and Assumptions 2a and 3a collapse to Assumptions 2 and 3. More generally, Assumptions 1, 2a and 3a are jointly satisfied by cost functions c(x i ,ω i ) = µ(ω i )x i , µ′(ω i ) < 0, and by inverse demand functions with p x (x i , y i ) ≤ p y (x i , y i ) < 0 and p xx (x i , y i ) ≤ p xy (x i ,y i ) ≤ 0 (assuming that the love-of-variety condition is satisfied). As in Section 2, a total differentiation of the first-order condition (1a) yields
under Assumptions 1 and 2a. Summing (3a) over i yields
Given the similarity of these equations to the corresponding equations in Section 2, it should be clear that 
Bertrand competition
Suppose that firm i's demand function is given by Bloch (1995) shows that inverting
The Bertrand equilibrium is a vector of prices which satisfies the first-order condition
Under Assumption 2b, (1) A total differentiation of the first-order condition (1b) yields
under Assumptions 1 and 2b. Summing (3b) over i yields
and dp i = −λ i riding by latecomers and endorses a membership fee structure which would require latecomers to compensate the early members for their investments (e.g., Carlton and Salop, 1996) . In this context, the results of this paper suggest that member firms of a large venture have strategic incentives to demand fees from new members which are higher than necessary to recoup their investments.
Second, if joint-venture members make their long-run investments collectively in order to maximize their joint profits after joint-venture formation, they will reduce their investments if and only if a member firm's investment has negative effects on other member firms' joint profits. In the current paper, a firm's investment which increases its stock of productive assets reduces other firms' profits (Lemma 2), so that joint-venture formation will lead to a reduction in investment. Then, the industry investments under the industry-wide joint venture will be lower than under several competing joint ventures. This reduction in investment is analogous to the output reduction by a cartel (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985; Perry and Porter, 1985; Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983) 17 . Elsewhere, I investigate stable coalition structures in the context of output cartels in a linear homogeneous-good Cournot oligopoly model (Yi, 1997a ). There, I show that, due to free-riding problems, the grand coalition is not a stable outcome under the Open Membership rule for N ≥ 3. Bloch (1996) shows that the grand coalition is not the equilibrium outcome of the Coalition Unanimity game for N ≥ 6. These results suggest that the grand coalition typically will not be a stable outcome under various membership rules when firms form coalitions in order to internalize externalities associated with investments. 18 In contrast, the grand coalition is a stable outcome under the Open Membership rule when symmetric firms form coalitions in order to share their existing productive assets, as in the current paper.
Finally, I have assumed symmetric firms. Extending the analysis to asymmetric firms is a nontrivial exercise, because the composition of a joint venture matters. However, the results of this paper suggest that big firms with large stocks of productive assets have strategic incentives to demand disproportionately higher membership fees from small firms with small stocks of productive assets. Indeed, when Sematech, a joint venture among U.S.
semiconductor manufacturers, was founded in 1988, small firms complained that its membership fee structure (1% of a member firm's semiconductor sales revenue with a minimum contribution of $1 million and a maximum of $15 million) discriminated against them (Irwin and Klenow, 1996) . It would be interesting to conduct a formal analysis of membership fee structures of joint ventures among asymmetric firms.
Appendix
Proofs of Lemma 3, Propositions 7, 7a, 7b, Example 4, and corner equilibrium follow.
Proof of Lemma 3. The first k firms have the same stock of productive assets, equal to ω 1 ;
hence they have the same output equal to x 1 , the same profit equal to π 1 , the same λ equal to λ 1 and the same δ equal to δ 1 . Thus, without loss of generality, I show that the claim holds for firm 1. 
, using the fact that the first k -1 firms have the same effective stock of productive assets and thus the same δ, which is equal to δ 1 . These firms have the same λ as well, equal to λ 1 . Hence, 
. By induction hypothesis, the remaining firms announce k -r -R(t-2), r t-2 , ..., r 1 . Firm
By induction hypothesis, the remaining firms announce k -r -R(t′-3), r t′-3 , ..., r 1 . Firm N-k+1
But π′ < π*. (By declaring r′ instead of k -R(t-1), firm N-k+1 merges the size-(k-R(t-1)) venture (to which it belongs) and the size-r t-1 , ..., size-r t′-1 ventures. Decompose this merger into (t -t′ + 1) steps. In step 1, the size-(k-R(t-1)) venture merges with the size-r t-1 venture.
In step 2, the merged venture (whose size is k -R(t-2)) joins with the size-r t-2 venture, and so on until it merges with the size-r t′-1 venture.
Step 1 reduces firm N-k+1's profit, since k -R(t-
Step 2 further reduces firm N-k+1's profit, since k -R(t-2) ≥ r t + r t-1 > r t-1 .
Similarly, the remaining steps reduce firm N-k+1's profit.) Q.E.D. 
It follows from Lemma
Proof.
(1) As in Lemma A2, consider dω = (dω,...,dω, (k-1)dω, 0,...,0).
from E(c ω 1 ) ≤ 1. The second inequality follows from condition (c).
Making these changes in the above derivation shows that
Notice the similarities and differences between Lemmas A2 and A2a. While the first part of Lemma A2 technically extends to differentiated products, the condition that (2) Analogous to Lemma A2a.
Q.E.D.
2 For example, a recent report by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on competition policy recognizes that many collaborative agreements among competitors are procompetitive (FTC, 1996, p. 6 ).
3 Other concerns include the possibility that a joint venture could serve as a vehicle for collusion in the input market and/or in the output market. See Carlton and Salop (1996) for a detailed discussion. States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944) ). See Areeda (1989) and Werden (1988) for more discussion of this doctrine.
5 SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994) . The Bylaws of the Visa venture state that Visa membership is unavailable to any bank that issues "competitive" cards, which include American Express and Discover but not MasterCards. The district court reached a verdict for Dean Witter. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the Visa venture did not have the market power to inflict substantial harm to Dean Witter. Carlton and Salop (1996) argue that the Tenth Circuit erred by considering the individual market power of member firms of the Visa venture, rather than the collective exclusionary market power of the venture. For detailed discussions of this case, see Carlton and Frankel (1995a, 1995b) , Carlton and Salop (1996) , and Evans and Schmalensee (1995) .
allows for exclusivity in membership. Earlier versions of this paper examined other exclusionary membership rules and showed that the main conclusion of this paper continued to hold: members of a large joint venture have strategic incentives to limit membership in order to keep rival firms' costs high.
13 Proposition 7 also applies to cost functions with increasing returns to scale in production of the following form: c(x i ,ω i ) = ν(ω i ) + µ(ω i )x i , with ν′(ω i ) ≤ 0, µ′(ω i ) < 0 and µ″(ω i ) ≤ 0.
The only modification necessary to the proof of Proposition 7 (the second part of Lemma A2)
is that E(c ω i ) is less than or equal to 1, instead of being equal to 1.
14 The social surplus is multiplied by (N + 1) 2 . The equilibrium joint-venture structure under the Coalition Unanimity game is approximated to {3N/4,N/4}. But the results for N = 4 are exact. 15 The assumption that the composition of competitors' outputs does not affect firm i's demand is equivalent to the assumption that ∂p i (x)/∂x j = ∂p i (x)/∂x k , i ≠ j ≠ k: an increase in firm j's output the same effect on firm i's inverse demand as an increase in firm k's output does for any
x.
16 But Proposition 7a uses the same linear demand function as in Bloch (1995) . The proof of Proposition 7a in the Appendix reports conditions on λ i C and δ i C under which Bloch's results are extended. However, these conditions are sufficiently complex that it is hard to interpret
